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ERISA Preemption and the Case for a Federal
Common Law of Agency Governing
Employer-Administrators
Joshua A. T Fairfieldt
Imagine that one day you become very sick. You are ill enough
that you end up in the hospital, running up a heavy bill. You recover
over the next several weeks, and, since your health insurance is com-
pletely covered by your job, you feel that you have come out of a bad
situation fairly well. Then you get the bad news: your employer has
been quietly pocketing your premiums for some time, and the insurer
has informed your employer that your insurance has been terminated.
You have never dealt directly with the insurer before in your life:
premiums, information about policy changes, and even the summaries
discussing what coverage the policy actually contains have all been
managed by your employer acting on the insurer's behalf.
Now, imagine your confusion when you are informed that you
cannot get your health benefits from the insurer. Despite crossing
every "t" and dotting every "i," you are cut off. You will be upset to
learn that just one year ago, you would have been able to collect full
benefits under a state law declaring that when employers perform all
of the functions of a plan administrator and take the place of the in-
surer or the insurer's agent, they are considered to be agents of the in-
surer. This would have allowed you to collect, since your premium
payments delivered to your employer would be deemed to have been
delivered directly to the insurer. However, the Supreme Court deter-
mined in May 1999 that the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA") preempted your state's agency law. Although
federal courts could replace the preempted state agency law with a
federal common law rule of agency pursuant to ERISA, they have
remained hesitant to do so.'
ERISA preemption of state law has created scores of commonly
recognized problems.' The foremost of these is that ERISA preemp-
t B.A. 1996, Swarthmore College; J.D. Candidate 2001,The University of Chicago.
1 Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829, codified in various sections of titles 26 and 29 (1994).
2 This hypothetical is based on ERISA's preemption of state agency rules as set forth in
UNUM Life Insurance Co of America v Ward, 526 US 358,378-79 (1999) (reversing in part and
affirming in part a Ninth Circuit decision allowing the employee's suit to proceed).
3 See notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
4 See, for example, Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants'
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tion of state law creates a "regulatory vacuum," wherein remedies and
causes of action previously available under state law are cut short.'
Such a vacuum creates a situation of "almost palpable unfairness."6
The Supreme Court, therefore, held that Congress intended federal
courts to develop federal common law remedies pursuant to ERISA
in order to fill the vacuum.' Courts have tended to use this power with
caution.! In light of this reluctance, Congress has reaffirmed the power
and the obligation of the federal judiciary to develop common law
rules governing ERISA plans.' An increasing number of decisions
have therefore recognized both the necessity of developing federal
common law rules' and the strength of Congress's intent that courts
do so.
In a recent decision, UNUM Life Insurance Co of America v
Ward," the Supreme Court held that state law (in this case, California
law) governing the agency of an employer acting as a plan administra-
tor was preempted by ERISA 2 The selection of agency rules for em-
ployers who are also plan administrators is important because if the
employer is the employee's agent, the employer or the insurance
company (or both) can take advantage of the uninformed employee.
Ward has created this exact situation by holding that laws determining
the employer the insurer's agent have been preempted. This Comment
Rights by Expanding the Federal Common Law of ERISA, 72 Wash U L Q 671, 671-72 (1994)
(arguing that ERISA preemption of state rules creates a system of "betrayal without remedy");
William K. Carr and Robert L. Liebross, Wrongs Without Rights: The Need for a Strong Federal
Common Law of ERISA, 4 Stan L & Pol Rev 221,223-24 (1992-93) (arguing that federal pre-
emption denies remedies, creating serious equity problems).
5 Zanglein, 72 Wash U L Q at 676 (cited in note 4), citing Daniel Fox and Daniel Schaffer,
Semi-Preemption in ERISA: Legislative Process and Health Policy, 7 Am J Tax Pol 47,48 (1988).
6 Zanglein, 72 Wash U L Q at 676 ("The feeling of unfairness is palpable."), citing Smith v
Hartford Insurance Group, 6 F3d 131, 146 (3d Cir 1993) (Hutchinson dissenting).
7 See Pilot Life Insurance Co v Dedeaux, 481 US 41, 56 (1987) (stating that Congress in-
tended federal courts to develop a "federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-
regulated plans"). See also Statement of Senator Javits, Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974-Conference Report, 93d Cong, 2d Sess, in 120 Cong Rec S 29928, 29942 (Aug 22,
1974) ("It is [ ] intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts
to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans.").
8 See note 29.
9 Report to Accompany Recommendations from the Committee on Labor and Education
("Recommendation Report"), HR Rep No 101-247, 101st Cong, 1st Sess 56 (1989).
10 See, for example, Varity Corp v Howe, 516 US 489, 497, 515 (1996) (holding as a matter
of federal common law that ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 USC § 1132(a)(3) (1994), authorizes lawsuits
for individualized equitable relief for breach of fiduciary obligations). See also Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co v Bruch, 489 US 101, 110 (1989) (holding that courts are to develop a "federal com-
mon law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans"); Provident Life & Accident
Insurance Co v Waller, 906 F2d 985, 990 (4th Cir 1990) ("[W]e must ... develop and add to the
growing federal common law of ERISA rights and obligations.").
11 526 US 358 (1999).
12 Id at 364 ("California's agency law... does 'relate to' employee benefit plans, and there-
fore does not occupy ground outside ERISA's preemption clause.").
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will address how courts should fill this vacuum by adopting a federal
common law rule, pursuant to ERISA, determining when an em-
ployer-administrator is an agent of the employee and when an em-
ployer-administrator is an agent of the insurer. This Comment further
suggests that such a rule should consist of a fact-sensitive determina-
tion of agency, tailored to protect ERISA beneficiaries.
Part I of this Comment discusses the mechanics of ERISA pre-
emption and courts' authority to adopt federal common law pursuant
to ERISA. Part II discusses the Ward decision, the California agency
law that it supplanted, and agency law more generally. Part III ana-
lyzes the options from which courts may select a rule and presents the
specific federal common law solution that courts should choose. The
selected rule must fulfill the statutory purposes of ERISA (to protect
plan beneficiaries), and only a rule that conducts a fact-sensitive
analysis of the relationship between the employee, the employer, and
the insurer will adequately protect the interests of plan beneficiaries.
I. ERISA PREEMPTION AND ADOPTION OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
PURSUANT TO ERISA
A. The ERISA Statute and ERISA Preemption of State Law
ERISA was enacted in order to address congressional concerns
regarding the impact that "the growth in size, scope, and numbers of
employee benefit plans" was having on the "continued well-being and
security of millions of employees and their dependents."" Congress
sought a unified system of federal rules to govern the administration
of employee benefit plans, and therefore drafted ERISA Section
514(a), which preempts state laws "insofar as they ... relate to any
[ERISA-covered] employee benefit plan."'"
In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v Travelers Insurance Co," the Supreme Court held that two types of
state laws "relate to" employee benefit plans within the meaning of
Section 514(a): laws that "mandate employee benefit structures or
their administration," and laws "providing alternative enforcement
mechanisms."'" In Ward, the California employer-agency rule was held
to "relate to" the ERISA plan because it created a "mandatory con-
13 29 USC § 1001(a) (1994).
14 29 USC § 1144(a) (1994).
15 514 US 645 (1995).
16 Id at 658. See also Ward v Management Analysis Company Employee Disability Benefit
Plan, 135 F3d 1276, 1287 (9th Cir 1998) (citing Travelers, 514 US at 657-58), affd in part, revd in
part as UNUM Life Insurance Co of America v Ward, 526 US 358 (1999).
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tract term" and controlled portions of the relationship between the
employer and the insured.'7
B. State Laws That "Regulate Insurance" Are Saved from
ERISA Preemption
In conjunction with Section 514(a), ERISA also contains a "sav-
ings clause," which saves from preemption state laws relating to em-
ployee benefit plans that also "[regulate] insurance."'8 The Ward court
reiterated the standard for determining whether a state law is consid-
ered saved: the court first determines whether, on a "common-sense
view of the matter," the state law regulates insurance.'9 The court also
applies a three-prong test to determine whether the state law regu-
lates the "business of insurance" as set forth in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act:" (1) whether the regulation has the "effect of transfer-
ring or spreading a policyholder's risk," (2) whether the regulation "is
an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and in-
sured," and (3) whether the regulation "is limited to entities within the
insurance industry."" The law evolved further in Ward itself, where the
Court held that a state law satisfying some but not all of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson factors was nevertheless saved from preemption." If the
state law is found, as a matter of "common sense," to regulate insur-
ance or if it meets, on balance, the McCarran-Ferguson factors, then
courts will typically find that the state law is saved.-'
Space for the adoption of federal common law pursuant to
ERISA is created by those laws preempted but not saved. Many state
rules fall into this gap. For example, the Supreme Court has held that
17 Ward, 526 US at 374-75, quoting Cisneros v UNUM Life Insurance Co of America, 134
F3d 939,946 (9th Cir 1998), cert denied, 526 US 1086 (1999).
18 ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 USC § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994). See Ward, 526 US at 373 (hold-
ing that California's notice-prejudice rule was a state law regulating insurance and saved from
preemption); Hood v Prudential Insurance Co of America, 460 S2d 1227, 1230 (Ala 1984) (hold-
ing that Alabama law governs insurance companies and is not preempted by ERISA).
19 Ward, 526 US at 367, citing Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v Massachusetts, 471 US 724,
740 (1985).
20 Pub L No 79-15,59 Stat 33 (1945), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 1011 et seq (1994).
21 Ward, 526 US at 358, citing Metropolitan Life, 471 US at 743.
22 See Ward, 526 US at 373-75.
23 Pilot Life Insurance Co v Dedeaux, 481 US 41,50 (1987) ("A common-sense view of the
word 'regulates' would lead to the conclusion that in order to regulate insurance, a law must not
just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward that in-
dustry.").
24 See, for example, District of Columbia v Greater Washington Board of Trade, 506 US 125,
130-32 (1992) (finding preempted but not saved a District of Columbia statute requiring em-
ployers to provide coverage equivalent to the existing health insurance coverage of an employee
while the employee received workers' compensation benefits); FMC Corp v Holliday, 498 US 52,
65 (1990) (finding preempted but not saved a section of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Law as applied to ERISA plans). See also Zanglein, 72 Wash U L Q at 671-74
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state laws drawn from general common law principles are not limited
to entities in the insurance industry, and therefore fail the third
McCarran-Ferguson factor."
C. Courts Have the Authority to Adopt Federal Common Law
Pursuant to ERISA
There is no question that courts have the authority to develop a
federal common law specifically adapted to ERISA plans.26 The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly recognized this authority.27 Legislative
history shows that, at the time of the adoption of ERISA, Congress in-
tended federal courts to fill gaps created by ERISA preemption with a
federal common law specifically adapted to ERISA plans." Neverthe-
less, courts expressed hesitation in exercising this power." A congres-
sional committee has reaffirmed that, as part of the carefully consid-
ered design of ERISA, the federal courts are to "shape legal and equi-
(cited in note 4) (providing examples of preemption without saving of state law remedies for
fraudulent denial of benefits and punitive damages).
25 Pilot Life Insurance, 481 US at 51. Since the Ward court has determined that state em-
ployer agency rules fall squarely into the preemption gap, the precise contours of the ERISA
preemption gap are beyond the scope of this Comment. For further discussion of the contours of
ERISA preemption, see Howard Shapiro, Rend E. Thorne, and Edward F. Harold, ERISA Pre-
emption: To Infinity and Beyond and Back Again? (A Historical Review of Supreme Court Juris-
prudence), 58 La L Rev 997, 1001 (1998) (analyzing trends in sixteen Supreme Court cases on
ERISA preemption).
26 See notes 7-9 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
employer agency as a matter of general federal common law (that is, federal common law not
pursuant to any statute) in Boseman v Connecticut General Life Insurance Co, 301 US 196,204-
05 (1937). Courts had derived authority to develop nonstatutory general federal common law
from the Supreme Court's decision in Swift v Tyson, 41 US 1, 18 (1842). Soon after the Boseman
decision, however, the Court determined in Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64, 78-80
(1938), that federal courts could not create or declare general federal common law, but must de-
fer to state law in the absence of a controlling federal statute. As a result, the development of
employer agency rules passed into state hands. However, both the Supreme Court and Congress
have recognized that courts may develop a federal common law interpreting and filling out the
ERISA statute. See note 29. The ability to adopt federal common law rules pursuant to a statute
is different from the unfettered discretion of Swift that the Court rejected in Erie; federal com-
mon law rules adopted under ERISA are limited by, and must conform to, the purpose of the
statute, which is to protect plan beneficiaries. See Part III.E.1. For a discussion of when courts
should exercise this authority (as opposed to whether they have it), see Part II.D.
27 See notes 7-10.
28 See note 7.
29 "[W]e must undertake ... [to] develop and add to the growing federal common law of
ERISA rights and obligations." Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co v Waller, 906 F2d 985,
990 (4th Cir 1990). However, the court also remarked: "Despite the power of the federal courts
to fill in the interstices of ERISA, we must respect the fact that Congress in creating ERISA has
.. 'expressly announced its intention to occupy the field.' Accordingly, we must proceed cau-
tiously .... Id at 992. Because congressional authorization is a foundation of the courts' author-
ity to develop ERISA common law, congressional intent is clearly relevant to the appropriate
scope of these common law remedies. See Parts III.E.1-2 for a more complete discussion of con-
gressional intent regarding ERISA.
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table remedies to fit the facts and circumstances of the cases before
them, even though those remedies may not be specifically mentioned
in ERISA itself."30 Courts have therefore begun to recognize the need
for a federal common law to fill the gaps where ERISA is silent.' As
discussed in Part II, the recent preemption of state agency rules de-
termining when an employer administering an insurance plan is
deemed the agent of the insurer has created a gap in the law which
courts should fill using their power to develop federal common law.
II. PREEMPTION OF STATE EMPLOYER AGENCY LAW: CALIFORNIA
LAW AND THE WARD DECISION
A. Agency Law and California's Employer Agency Rule
1. The law of agency and its impact on the job
insurance context.
An agent is a person who, pursuant to authority delegated by a
principal, has the power to alter the legal relations of the principal by
acting on behalf of or in the place of the principal.2 Since the agent
acts on behalf of the principal, dealings with an agent acting within the
scope of his delegated authority are treated as dealings directly with
the principal.3 For example, information (such as notice) provided to
the agent is imputed to the principal, and contracts entered into by the
agent on behalf of the principal are binding on the principal. 1 Finally,
the same entity or person may act as an agent for different parties in
succession.3 Therefore, an employer who acts as an agent for an em-
ployee for one purpose may later act as an agent for an insurer for
another purpose."
30 See Recommendation Report, HR Rep No 101-247 at 56 (cited in note 9).
31 See notes 7-10.
32 See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958) ("Agency is the fiduciary relation which
results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his
behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act. The one for whom action is
to be taken is the principal. The one who is to act is the agent.").
33 See 3 Am Jur 2d Agency § 2 at 510 (1986) ("It is ... a consequence of the relationship
that whatever an agent does in the lawful prosecution of the transaction entrusted to him is the
act of the principal.").
34 See id § 281 at 784 (stating that "[t]he general rule ... is that the principal is chargeable
with, and bound by, the knowledge of or notice to his agent received while the agent is acting as
such within the scope of his authority"). See also id § 89 at 600 (stating that "[a]n agent may ...
be given the express authority to contract on behalf of the principal, or he may have the implied
or apparent power to enter into such a contract").
35 See, for example, Paulson v Western Life Insurance Co, 292 Or 38, 636 P2d 935,942-43,
949 (1981) (holding that an employer may act as an agent for employees or for an insurer at dif-
ferent times, depending on the purpose of the agency and the facts of the matter).
36 Id.
ERISA Preemption
Whether employers who administer everyday details of group
health insurance plans are deemed to be the agents of the plan benefi-
ciaries (that is, employees) or of the insurer is relevant to a number of
situations, such as when the master policyholder (the employer):
(1) determines an employee's eligibility for insurance in error; (2) fails
to remit premiums deducted from the employee's wages to the in-
surer; (3) wrongfully refuses to accept an employee's premium pay-
ments; (4) fails to list the insured employee on the insurance roll; or
(5) fails to notify the insurer of an insured's disability.37
If the employer who makes the misrepresentation or mistake is
acting as the insurer's agent when administering the plan, his or her
acts and non-fraudulent mistakes may be imputed to the insurer; if
not, the employee is usually denied coverage." The choice of the rule
characterizing employer agency is important, since it directly deter-
mines whether the plan beneficiary will be covered in situations where
the beneficiary is not at fault.
2. The California rule of employer agency.
Where an employer also acts as a plan administrator, California
case law, as expressed in Elfstrom v New York Life Insurance Co,"9
holds that "the employer is the agent of the insurer in performing the
duties of administering group insurance policies."' The Elfstrom court
based its agency determination on the fact that the employer was ad-
ministering the plan in the place of the insurer, that the interests of the
insurer and the employer were aligned in the context of plan admini-
stration, and that the employee had no control over the administration
4,
process.
The Ninth Circuit, in Ward v Management Analysis Co Employee
Disability Benefit Plan, 2 considered whether California's employer
37 See Stephen K. Eugster, Comment, Group Insurance: Agency Characterization of the
Master Policy-Holder, 46 Wash L Rev 377,383-88 (1971), for a more thorough discussion of the
importance of the agency determination in each of these situations.
38 Id. For a general discussion of the distinct issue of employer liability, see Tina Knight
Kukanza, Casenote, Varity Corp. v. Howe: Will it Cause an Increase in Litigation Against Employ-
ers Who Administer ERISA Plans?, 48 Mercer L Rev 965, 976 (1997) (discussing the Varity case
and its possible implications and suggesting that "Varity opens the door to individual lawsuits
against employers who are also plan administrators"). Even if the employer is liable as an
ERISA fiduciary (which is in doubt), it may be judgment proof, necessitating an agency rule al-
lowing suit against the insurer.
39 67 Cal 2d 503,432 P2d 731 (1967).
40 Id at 737. See also Sandoval v Raymond James Financial, Inc, 1999 US App LEXIS
20998, *6 (9th Cir) ("California law considers employers to be agents of the insurer, rather than
agents of the employee-insureds.").
41 432 P2d at 737-38. For a more extensive discussion of the Elfstrom holding, see Parts
III.B.1-2.
42 135 F3d 1276 (9th Cir 1998).
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agency rule was preempted by ERISA. The plaintiff, Ward, claimed to
have provided timely notice of his disease to his employer, who noti-
fied the insurer, UNUM, after the policy's notification time period had
expired.43 The Ninth Circuit found two grounds on which to reverse
the trial court." The first relied on California's notice-prejudice rule,
under which an insurer may not avoid liability for a delay in notifica-
tion of a claim unless it is established that the insurer suffered actual
prejudice as a result thereof." The Ninth Circuit ruled that the notice-
prejudice rule was saved by ERISA's savings clause as a state law
regulating insurance.4' Second, the Ninth Circuit found that the Elf-
strom rule was drawn from general principles of law as applied to the
specific insurance situation, and was therefore not a state law "relating
to" ERISA plans.7 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed and re-
manded the case to the district court to determine whether, under Elf-
strom, the employer was UNUM's agent, and therefore whether the
receipt of notice by the employer was attributed to the insurer-
principal.8 The Ninth Circuit's decision in Ward followed the trend of
modern state decisions, which tend toward deeming employers the
agents of insurers when they administer health plans. This area of
evolving law, however, was cut off by ERISA preemption, and has not
yet been replaced.
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in Ward
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and upheld the Ninth Cir-
cuit opinion insofar as it held that the California notice-prejudice rule
was saved as a state rule regulating insurance. 9 The Court determined
that it was unnecessary that a rule meet all of the McCarran-Ferguson
factors in order to regulate the business of insurance and be saved
from preemption."' The Court found that the notice-prejudice rule was
43 Id at 1279.
44 Id at 1286-89.
45 Id at 1280-81,1289.
46 Id at 1280.
47 Id at 1289.
48 Id at 1280-81, 1289.
49 Ward, 526 Us at 373.
50 The Court in Ward determined that the McCarran-Ferguson factors are "considerations
to be weighed ... and none is necessarily determinative in itself." Id at 360, quoting Pilot Life In-
surance Co v Dedeaux, 481 US 41, 49 (1987), and Union Labor Life Insurance Co v Pireno, 458
US 119, 129 (1982). However, whether or not a law is aimed at the insurance industry (the third
McCarran-Ferguson factor) seems to carry more weight than the other two. See Ward, 526 US at
373-74 (holding that California's notice-prejudice rule is saved from preemption because it
serves as an integral part of the insurance relationship (factor two) and is aimed at the insurance
industry (factor three) without an analysis of the Ninth Circuit's prior determination that the no-
tice-prejudice law did not in fact satisfy the "risk-spreading" factor (factor one)). Ward did not
argue that the employer agency rule was saved from preemption before the Supreme Court;
[68:223
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saved because it served as an "integral part of the policy relationship
between the insurer and the insured""' and "It]he rule 'does not
merely have an impact on the insurance industry; it is aimed at it.'
'2
However, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's deter-
mination that the state's agency rule was not preempted.53 By so doing,
the Court determined that California's agency laws pertaining to the
agency relationship of employer-administrators were preempted by
ERISA." In its determination that the California agency rule "related
to" ERISA plans, the Court concentrated on the impact of the Cali-
fornia rule on plan administration." The Court determined that the
agency rule "would force the employer, as plan administrator, to as-
sume a role, with attendant legal duties and consequences, that it has
not undertaken voluntarily."6 The Court concluded: "Satisfied that the
Elfstrom rule 'relates to' ERISA plans, we reject the Ninth Circuit's
contrary determination." 7
Without an agency rule, federal courts will necessarily defer to
whatever contractual terms the employer and insurer have agreed
upon." Insurers and employers will often contract out of liability (at
the expense of the employee) by having the employer serve as plan
administrator.9 After Ward, federal courts must choose whether they
wish to allow the contractual terms between the employer and the in-
surer to govern regardless of the effect on the employee's interests, or
whether they will craft a federal common law rule giving effect to
ERISA's statutory goal of protecting plan beneficiaries."
since the rule grew out of general principles of the common law of agency, prior Supreme Court
decisions would deem the rule not saved. Pilot Life Insurance Co, 481 US at 51 (holding that
state laws developed from general common law principles are not saved).
51 Ward, 526 US at 374, citing Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v Massachusetts, 471 US 724,
743 (1985).
52 Ward, 526 US at 375, quoting FMC Corp v Holliday, 498 US 52,61 (1990).
53 Ward, 526 US at 378-79.
54 Id. Preemption of state law without replacement in this case removes half a century of
legal evolution. See discussion of the Boseman rule in Parts III.A and III.D.1.
55 Ward, 526 US at 379 (holding that "deeming the policyholder-employer the agent of the
insurer would have a marked effect on plan administration").
56 Id.
57 Id (citation omitted).
58 See Torello v UNUM Life Insurance Co of America, 1999 US App LEXIS 32228, *12-13
(6th Cir) (relying on contract terms between employer and insurer in the absence of an agency
relationship).
59 See id. See also text accompanying note 71.
60 29 USC § 1001(a) (1994) ("[lt is desirable in the interests of employees and their bene-
ficiaries ... that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character of [retirement]
plans and their financial soundness."). See also Zanglein, 72 Wash U L Q at 671-72 (1994) (cited
in note 4) (discussing the need for federal common law rules to replace those remedies pre-
empted by ERISA).
2001]
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C. The Aftermath of Ward: An Opportunity for the Development of
a Federal Common Law of Employer Agency
The Supreme Court's opinion in Ward leaves open the possibility
of adopting a federal common law rule of agency for employer-
administrators. The Court determined that the state agency rule was
preempted," but it did not make a determination regarding the adop-
tion of a rule as a matter of federal common law.
The question of federal common law adoption therefore remains
unresolved. The Ninth Circuit had been requested to adopt the
Elfstrom approach as federal common law if it found the rule pre-
empted. 62 The Ninth Circuit reserved this question for a later date,
finding instead that the Elfstrom rule was not preempted by ERISA.
The question of federal common law adoption of a rule of agency
was raised again before the Supreme Court.6' The Solicitor General
suggested remand to the Ninth Circuit to decide whether "the
Elfstrom rule, or something like it" should be adopted as the federal
common law standard. The Court did not rule on this issue, resolving
the case instead on its determination that California's notice-prejudice
rule was saved as a state law "regulating insurance."
Cases subsequent to Ward show a gap in the law that will consid-
erably impede beneficiaries from recovering plan benefits. A consid-
erable number of states have adopted rules allowing beneficiaries to
recover via agency.6 However, in Torello v UNUM Life Insurance Co
of America,6 as one example, the Sixth Circuit held that Ohio's agency
rule was simply preempted, citing Ward:
61 Ward, 526 US at 367 n 1 ("Common-law rules developed by decisions of state courts are
'State law' under ERISA."), citing 29 USC § 1144(c)(1) (1994) ("The term 'State law' includes all
laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law.").
62 See Ward, 135 F3d at 1281, 1284.
63 Id at 1289.
64 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner in Part and Support-
ing Respondent in Part *7, UNUM Life Insurance Co of America v Ward, No 97-1868 (filed Nov
27, 1998) (available on Lexis at 1997 U.S. Briefs 1868) ("The Elfstrom rule is not saved by the in-
surance savings provision.... A federal court in a case like this could, however, apply similar
agency principles as a matter of federal common law under ERISA.").
65 Id at *28 (suggesting that the case be remanded for the Ninth Circuit to decide whether
the Elfstrom rule applies "as a matter of federal, not California, common law").
66 Ward, 526 US at 364.
67 See, for example, Torello v UNUM Life Insurance Co of America, 1999 US App LEXIS
32228, *13 (6th Cir) (denying employee recovery due to contract shielding employer from the
breach of fiduciary duty claim).
68 Following the demise of general federal common law in Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins,
304 US 64,79-80 (1938), this area of law has been exclusively developed by state law. See note 90
for a list of states providing such protection.
69 1999 US App LEXIS 32228 (6th Cir).
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We find that G&J Bottlers did not serve as an agent for UNUM.
The long-term disability insurance policy contains a provision
that explicitly states G&J Bottlers is not UNUM's agent. Even if
Ohio law provided otherwise, a state law that purports to make a
policyholder-employer an agent of an insurer is preempted by
ERISA. In the absence of an agency relationship between G&J
Bottlers and UNUM, any notice Torello may have provided to
G&J Bottlers is of no moment."°
Without a federal common law agency rule governing actions taken
by employer-administrators, plan beneficiaries will often lack any
remedy."
Moreover, in many instances insurers will also suffer because of
the gap created by preemption. A sophisticated agency rule will make
the employer-administrator the agent of the employee when their in-
terests are aligned (as in contract negotiation settings)." If state em-
ployer-agency laws are preempted without replacement, insurers will
not be able to rely on the assumption that employers are acting as
agents for the employees in contract negotiation settings.
73
D. The Thomason Discussion: When Should Courts Adopt State
Rules as a Matter of Federal Common Law?
The Seventh Circuit has proposed a framework within which
courts should adopt state rules as federal common law to fill gaps in
ERISA." First, ERISA itself must "not expressly address the issue be-
fore the court." 5 Second, while state common law may serve "as a ba-
sis for new federal common law," development of federal common law
must be consistent with the congressional "policies underlying
ERISA.,7 6 Courts may therefore use state-developed rules as federal
common law, "but only to the extent that state law is not inconsistent
with congressional policy concerns."7
70 Id at *13 (citations omitted).
71 See Zanglein, 72 Wash U L Q at 674 (cited in note 4) ("The participant is caught in the
vortex of an ever-expanding preemptive black hole, unregulated by ERISA, and unprotected by
state law.").
72 See Boseman v Connecticut General Life Insurance Co, 301 US 196,204-05 (1937) (list-
ing insurance-related tasks completed by employer when not acting as an agent of the insurer).
73 See Jones v Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co, 605 F Supp 179, 183 (S D Miss 1985) (hold-
ing that employee did not delegate negotiating authority to employer for negotiations with in-
surer), affd in part, vacated in part, 800 F2d 1397 (5th Cir 1986).
74 Thomason v Aetna Life Insurance Co, 9 F3d 645, 647 (7th Cir 1993) (holding that state
rules may be used as a basis for new federal common law rules under ERISA only if they com-
port with Congress's intent regarding the statute).
75 Id, quoting Nachwalter v Christie, 805 F2d 956,959 (11th Cir 1986). See also Zanglein, 72
Wash U L Q at 716 (cited in note 4) (citing Thomason for the same proposition).
76 Thomason, 9 F3d at 647.
77 Id.
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The first prong is easily met; there is no agency rule set forth in
ERISA. As to the second, the relevant congressional policy concerns
are (1) the protection of beneficiaries, 8 and (2) that remedies available
before the enactment of ERISA should not be removed simply be-
cause ERISA does not explicitly mention them.79 To these ends, Con-
gress stated explicitly that courts were to supplement ERISA with
federal common law. ° The question remaining is which, if any, of the
existing state rules best provides remedies that adequately protect
beneficiaries' interests. At least three possible state rules could be
adopted. The majority rule among the states designates the employer
the agent of the employee both when negotiating a contract with the
employer and later when administering the plan." The minority ap-
proach would designate the employer the agent of the insurer. 8 The
integrated approach makes a fact-specific determination of whether
the employer was acting on behalf of the insurer or the employee.0
These rules, and criteria courts might employ in choosing among them,
are discussed in more detail below.
III. THE OPTIONS: MAJORITY, MINORITY, AND INTEGRATED RULES
OF EMPLOYER AGENCY
A. The Majority Rule: Boseman v Connecticut General Life
Insurance Co"
Federal courts should overcome their hesitancy toward creating a
federal common law of employer agency pursuant to ERISA. They
78 29 USC § 1001a(c)(3) (1994). See also Zanglein, 72 Wash U L Q at 674 (cited in note 4)
(noting "ERISA's stated goal of safeguarding the rights of plan participants").
79 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co v Bruch, 489 US 101, 114 (1989) (rejecting interpreta-
tion "that would afford less protection to employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed
before ERISA was enacted"). See also Sanson v General Motors Corp, 966 F2d 618, 623 n 2
(11th Cir 1992) (Birch dissenting) ("I do not subscribe to the view that for every wrong there
must necessarily be a remedy. However, where there is a remedy ... I find it difficult to compre-
hend, in a common sense way, how a law enacted to protect the very class of individuals into
which the appellant squarely fits can be construed to deny him such a preexisting remedy.").
80 See Recommendation Report, HR Rep No 101-247 at 56 (cited in note 9) ("Congress in-
tended for the courts to develop a Federal common law with respect to employee benefit plans,
including the development of appropriate remedies, even if they are not specifically enumerated
in ... ERISA."). See also notes 7-9,26-30, and accompanying text.
81 See note 90 for a list of majority rule jurisdictions.
82 See note 93 for a list of minority rule jurisdictions.
83 See, for example, Golt v Aetna Life Insurance Co, 2000 Mont 155, 2 P3d 841,849 (2000)
(holding that employer, in administering the insurance plan, acts as agent of the insurer); Dawes
Mining Co v Callahan, 246 Ga 531, 272 SE2d 267, 269 (1980) (same); Norby v Bankers Life Co,
304 Minn 464, 231 NW2d 665, 669 (1975) (same); Paulson v Western Life Insurance Co, 292 Or
38, 636 P2d 935 (1967) (same). See also note 93 for a list of integrated rule jurisdictions. The
Comment treats integrated cases as a subset of the minority rule cases.
84 301 US 196, 204-05 (1937) (holding that employer-administrators act as the agents of
employees when negotiating a contract or administrating a plan).
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had, in fact, already begun to develop law on the topic as a matter of
general federal common law prior to Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins.'
In 1937 the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Boseman v Connecti-
cut General Life Insurance Co' that set forth the following rule:
"[w]hen procuring the policy, [and] obtaining applications of employ-
ees ... employers act not as agents of the insurer but for their employ-
ees or for themselves."' Although the "employer as agent of the em-
ployee" rule, set forth in Boseman, sought to determine the agency of
an employer engaged in contract negotiations (and not in employer-
administrator situations), it supports the proposition that agency de-
terminations regarding employers are desirable and necessary as a
matter of federal common law.
Boseman in and of itself is no longer good law, since the Erie
Court determined that federal courts may not develop general federal
common law." However, during the period in which federal courts
lacked authority to speak on the subject, Boseman was often emulated
by the state rules that replaced it (and that are now preempted by
ERISA), and it is now considered the majority rule among the states.
85 304 US 64 (1938).
86 301 US 196 (1937).
87 Id at 204-05.
88 Id.
89 Erie, 304 US at 78 (stating that "[t]here is no federal general common law"). See also
Sampson v Channell, 110 F2d 754,761 (1st Cir 1940) ("Under Swift v. Tyson... the federal courts
were free to disregard state court decisions on matters of 'general law' .... But under [Erie] the
[state] law must be determined by the state statutes and the common law as interpreted by the
state courts, not by the federal court's notion of 'general law."').
90 The following states have either adopted the Boseman rule or have adopted rules that
have the same effect. Alabama: Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama v Fowler, 43 Ala App 572,
195 S2d 910,914-15 (1966); but see All States Life Insurance Co v Tillman, 226 Ala 245,146 S 393,
396 (1933) (without discussing agency, determining that employer error did not terminate em-
ployee's insurance); Arkansas: Hendrix v Republic National Life Insurance Co, 270 Ark 955,606
SW2d 601,603 (1980); Connecticut: Emerick v Connecticut General Life Insurance Co, 120 Conn
60, 179 A 335,338 (1935); Florida: Couch v Connecticut General Life Insurance Co, 216 S2d 72,74
(Fla App 1968); Illinois: Phelps v Elgin Academy, 125 I11 App 2d 364,260 NE2d 864, 867 (1970);
but see Patterson v John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co, 27 I11 App 135,169 NE2d 183,187
(1960) (illustrating limited circumstances under which employer is insurer's agent); Indiana:
Hayes v Lincoln General Insurance Co, 899 F2d 684,686 (7th Cir 1990) (applying Indiana state
law); Kansas: Leach v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 124 Kan 584,261 P 603 (1927); Kentucky:
Continental Assurance Co v Henson, 297 Ky 764, 181 SW2d 431, 433 (1944); Maine: Palmer v
Newport Trust Co, 245 A2d 438, 441-42 (Me 1968) (holding that a bank is the agent of the in-
sured when remitting premiums); Michigan: Barza v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 281 Mich
532, 275 NW 238, 241 (1937); New Hampshire: Duval v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 82 NH
543,136 A 400,403-05 (1927); New Jersey: Mosior v Insurance Co of North America, 193 NJ Su-
per 190,473 A2d 86,89 (1984); New York: Estock v Associated Hospital Service of New York, Inc,
257 NYS2d 559,45 Misc 2d 504,505 (Civ Ct 1964) (holding failure of employer to forward insur-
ance certificate to employee could not stop insurer from asserting two year statute of limita-
tions); Fidelity & Casualty Co v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 248 NYS2d 559,42 Misc 2d 616,
631 (Sup Ct 1963) (holding that employer stands in shoes of employee when he contracts for
group insurance); Ohio: Hroblak v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 50 Ohio LAbs 395, 79 NE2d
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Since Boseman, however, other states have developed contrary rules
that better serve the purposes of ERISA and are therefore better
suited for adoption.'
B. The Minority Approach
1. Development of the minority approach among the states.
One alternative approach to employer agency first encourages
courts to examine
"the way group insurance is set up and operated ... [and then to
determine whether] the employer should be charged with the
performance of certain functions on behalf of the insurance
company," rather than resolve first the agency question and then
decide whether the employer is charged with some functions on
behalf of the insurer.92
The unmistakable trend in recent cases has been to adopt the minority
rule (employer is agent of the insurer) or the integrated approach,
which makes a fact-specific determination of the employer's role."3 In-
360,364 (App 1947); Pennsylvania: Layman v Continental Assurance Co, 416 Pa 155,205 A2d 93,
95-96 (1964); Hanaieff v Equitable Life Assurance Society, 371 Pa 560, 92 A2d 202,204-05 (1952);
Tennessee: Tibbs v Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 179 Tenn 594, 168 SW2d
779 (1943); Texas: Johnson v Johnson, 139 F2d 930, 934 (5th Cir 1943) (applying Texas law); but
see Missouri State Life Insurance Co v Compton, 73 SW2d 1079,1086 (Tex Civ App 1934) (hold-
ing payment by employee through salary deduction by employer was payment to the insurer);
Utah: Sorenson v Hartford Accident and Life Insurance Co, 585 P2d 440, 441 (1978); West Vir-
ginia: South Branch Valley National Bank v Williams, 151 W Va 775, 155 SE2d 845, 849 (1967).
The federal courts have also adopted such a rule for local District of Columbia cases. Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co v Ross, 1976 US Dist LEXIS 11840 at *7 (D DC).
See 43 Am Jur 2d Insurance § 110 (1982) ("[E]mployers, in doing the various acts required
to make effective a policy of group insurance covering employees ... act for themselves and their
employees, and not as agents of the insurer.") (citing Boseman); John A. Appleman and Jean
Appleman, 1 Insurance Law and Practice § 43 at 89 (West 1981 & Supp 1992); John A. Appleman
and Jean Appleman, 16 Insurance Law and Practice § 8734 at 390 (West 1981 & Supp 1992). See
22 ALR 4th 321 §§ 10, 14-15 (1983 & Supp 1999), for a state by state list of responses to the
closely related problem of whether an employee's coverage terminates due to the employer's
failure to remit premiums.
91 See 29 USC § 1001a(c)(3) (1994) (describing Congress's intent to provide reasonable
protection to plan beneficiaries as among the primary purposes of ERISA).
92 Sadder v John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co, 291 A2d 500, 502 (DC App 1972),
quoting Eugster, Comment, 46 Wash L Rev at 407 (cited in note 37).
93 The following states have adopted the minority rule or have adopted a context-
dependent approach to determining when an employer is the agent of an insurer. Note that the
"minority approach" is no longer appreciably in the minority, and is followed by the majority of
modern decisions. California: Elfstrom, 432 P2d at 737; Colorado: New York Life Insurance Co v
Love, 163 Colo 7,428 P2d 364,366 (1967) (holding that payment by the insured to the employer
is payment to the insurer); Georgia: Dawes Mining Co v Callahan, 246 Ga 531, 272 SE2d 267,
269-70 (1980); Clements v Continental Casualty Insurance Co, 730 F Supp 1120,1123-24 (N D
Ga 1989) (applying Georgia law); Iowa: Freeman v Bonnes Trucking, Inc, 337 NW2d 871,874-75
(Iowa 1983); Louisiana: Neider v Continental Assurance Co, 213 La 621, 35 S2d 237, 240-41
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sofar as this developing strand of case law is concerned, three cases
are of particular interest: Elfstrom v New York Life Insurance Co,
Paulson v Western Life Insurance Co,5 and the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Ward v Management Analysis Co Employee Disability Benefit
Plan.9
2. The Elfstrom rule: Employer as agent of the insurer.
The most straightforward minority approach is that espoused by
Elfstrom itself. Under a pure Elfstrom rule, the employer is simply
considered an agent of the insurer when managing a group insurance
plan. The Elfstrom court understood the reasoning behind the Bose-
man line of cases: "The rationale of these cases appears to be that the
employer is acting for its own benefit or for its employees in perform-
(1948); Massachusetts: Kirkpatrick v Boston Mutual Life Insurance Co, 393 Mass 640,473 NE2d
173, 176-78 (1985); Clauson v Prudential Insurance Co, 195 F Supp 72, 80 (D Mass 1961) (apply-
ing Massachusetts law), affd 296 F2d 76 (1st Cir 1961) (applying Massachusetts law); Minnesota:
Norby v Bankers Life Co, 304 Minn 464, 231 NW2d 665, 668-69 (1975); Mississippi: Home Life
Insurance Co v Chandler, 402 S2d 356, 359-60 (Miss 1981) (citing Boseman, but making a fact-
specific determination); Missouri: First National Bank v Farmers New World Life Insurance Co,
455 SW2d 517, 521-22 (Mo App 1970) (holding against agency in the particular case but using a
case-by-case approach to determine employer agency overall); Montana: Galt v Aetna Life In-
surance Co, 2000 Mont 155, 2 P3d 841, 848-49; North Carolina: Middleton v Russell Group, Ltd,
126 NC App 1, 483 SE2d 727, 733-34 (1997), affd after remand, 132 NC App 792, 514 SE2d 94
(1999); North Dakota: Finstad v Steiger Tractor, 301 NW2d 392, 395-96 (ND 1981); Oklahoma:
Baum v Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co, 357 P2d 960,964 (Okla 1960); Oregon: Paulson
v Western Life Insurance Co, 292 Or 38,636 P2d 935, 939-40 (1967); South Carolina: Weeks v Pi-
lot Life Insurance Co, 256 SC 81,180 SE2d 875,877-78 (1971) (holding that an employer deduct-
ing insurance premiums from an employee's wages was the agent of the insurer); Vermont: Ab-
biati v Buttura & Sons, 161 Vt 314,639 A2d 988,993 (1994); Wisconsin: Kaiser v Prudential Insur-
ance Co, 272 Wis 527,76 NW2d 311,315 (1956).
The following states have adopted rules to solve the problem of employer-administrator
misconduct without express statement of agency. Alabama: All States Life Insurance Co v
Tillman, 226 Ala 245, 146 S 393, 393-94 (1933) (holding that although nonagency provision is
valid, employer-deducted premiums are attributed to insurer); Delaware: Bureau of Adult Cor-
rection v Dernberger, 1987 Del Super LEXIS 1059, *5-6 ("Where medical bills are submitted to
the employer in a timely fashion.... claimant should not be prejudiced by the erroneous act of
the employer or its carrier ...").
The following states have not addressed the issue of employer agency in the insurance con-
text: Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Maryland, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
States now addressing or reassessing the issue are likely to follow the modern trend toward
the minority fact-specific approach. See, for example, Golt, 2 P3d at 841. The above cases obvi-
ously overlap with cases determining whether the failure of an employer to remit premiums ter-
minates the insurance of the employee (regardless of agency theories). See 22 ALR 4th 321
§§ 10, 13-14 at 344, 350-54 (cited in note 90) (treating issue on a state-by-state basis); John A.
Appleman and Jean Appleman, la Insurance Law and Practice § 352, 427-35 (West 1981)
(same).
94 432 P2d 731.
95 636 P2d 935.
96 135 F3d 1276 (9th Cir 1998).
97 Elfstrom, 432 P2d at 737.
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ing these tasks ... that the employer and the employees are allied in
their interests, and that these interests are adverse to the insurer.""
However, the Elfstrom court chose to reject the Boseman rule for the
employer-administrator setting, pointing out that "the employer car-
ries out the functions which the insurer necessarily would perform in
other types of insurance. ' '9S The Elfstrom court also seemed concerned
about the difficulties inherent in employee loss of benefits because of
the employer-manager's errors, which would occur under the Bose-
man rule. The court stated: "[S]ince the individual employee has no
knowledge of or control over the administrative acts performed by the
employer, it would be inequitable to charge him with the employer's
errors., ' °
The Elfstrom court found the employee's lack of control over the
employer in negotiating and handling the insurance dispositive of the
fact that, ultimately, the employer is the insurer's agent. 0' Note that al-
though the Elfstrom rule offers plan beneficiaries critical protection
against employer-administrator misconduct, it also impedes situations
where employees would legitimately be expected to delegate author-
ity to negotiate a contract. '°
3. The integrated approach.
In Paulson,°O the Oregon Supreme Court adopted an approach
that integrated the majority approach, as followed by Bowes v Lake-
side Industries, Inc,"' with the minority rule. '°o The Paulson court held
that the question of whether an employer was the agent of an insurer
or the insured was not a matter of adopting either standard but rather
a determination of fact:
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. See also Jones v Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co, 605 F Supp 179,182 (S D Miss 1985)
(discussing the Boseman principle).
101 The court reasoned:
The most persuasive rationale for adopting the view that the employer acts as the agent of
the insurer [ ] is that the employee has no knowledge of or control over the employer's ac-
tions in handling the policy or its administration. An agency relationship is based upon con-
sent by one person that another shall act in his behalf and be subject to his control.
432 P2d at 738.
102 See Part III.D.2.
103 636 P2d 935.
104 297 Minn 86,209 NW2d 900 (1973).
105 Paulson, 636 P2d at 941 ("It appears to us that Elfstrom and Bowes are neither inconsis-
tent with each other nor do they reflect the application of different rules."). See also Dawes Min-
ing Co v Callahan, 246 Ga 531, 272 SE2d 267, 269 (1980) (constructing a dividing line between
contract negotiation settings, where the employer is not the agent of the insurer, and later ad-
ministration settings, where the court deemed the employer the agent of the insurer).
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Our analysis of the decisions convinces us that many courts, even
though they purport to apply a "majority rule" or a "minority
rule," actually base their decision upon the facts relating to the
division of functions between the insurer and the employer-
policyholder, and that any "majority" or "minority" rule is more
apparent than real."
In Paulson, the Court compared the Elfstrom result to the majority
rule.'O' It noted that the primary difference between the approaches
was their characterization of the degree of autonomy exercised by the
employer in plan administration.' In Elfstrom, the plan was deemed
"employer administered" because the insurer had "delegated exten-
sive duties to the employer, including enrolling employees, adding and
deleting dependents, terminating and reinstating insurance, reporting
details of coverage, indicating the amounts of premiums paid, issuing
certificates of insurance, and determining eligibility for coverage."' °
However, majority rule jurisdictions had characterized the employer
as a mere "supplier of information," in contrast to the full-service em-
ployer-administrator of Elfstrom."'
On the basis of this fact-sensitive analysis, the Oregon Court
found that the majority and minority approaches both drew on the
same rule: "In the performance of a function delegated by the insurer
to the employer, the employer is deemed to be the agent of the in-
surer."" Since this Paulson approach is consistent with Boseman, yet
incorporates the evolution of the law since that time, this integrated
rule should be adopted by federal courts as a matter of federal com-
mon law under ERISA.
The Ninth Circuit, when deciding Ward, drew heavily on Paul-
son."2 The Ninth Circuit adopted the Paulson "question of fact" test as
consistent with and an improvement on the Elfstrom rule: "The Paul-
son formulation of the Elfstrom rule appears sound. It also comports
with our prior determination of the same issue."". Since the Ninth Cir-
cuit reserved the question as to whether this employer-agency stan-
dard would be adopted as a matter of federal common law, it is en-
tirely possible that the Ninth Circuit would adopt a Paulson integrated
approach as a federal common law rule. 1
106 636 P2d at 939.
107 Id at 940, analyzing Bowes, 209 NW2d at 900.
108 Paulson, 636 P2d at 941.
109 Id at 941, quoting Bowes, 209 NW2d at 901-02.
110 Paulson, 636 P2d at 941, quoting Bowes, 209 NW2d at 902. See also Dawes Mining Co,
272 SE2d at 269.
111 Paulson,636 P2d at 941.
112 Ward, 135 F3d at 1281-83 (specifically considering Paulson's treatment of Elfstrom).
113 Id at 1283 n 6.
114 See Part II.C for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's treatment of federal common law
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In Jones v Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co,"' a federal court had a
rare opportunity to voice its own determinations regarding the evolu-
tion of employer-agency rules. The Mississippi Supreme Court's inter-
pretive abstinence on the issue ' 16 opened the door for the Jones court
to adopt a fact-sensitive approach rather than either of the hard and
fast rules. "7
The Jones court was asked to determine whether an insurer had a
duty to inform the employee of any negotiated changes in the plan, or
whether the knowledge of the employer could be imputed to the em-
ployee as principal."8 The Jones court was troubled by the fact that the
employee had no real representation at policy negotiations, and con-
cluded that the employee had not delegated negotiating power."9 The
Jones decision is revealing because the court cited Boseman, which
found agency as the majority rule, but nevertheless found on the facts
of the case that the employer was not the agent of the employee when
negotiating the policy.2 ' This outcome lends credence to the suggestion
that federal courts will act as state courts have in making fact-specific
determinations based on the nature of the action undertaken by the
employer-agent."'
4. The federal common law of employer agency.
Federal courts should follow the congressional mandate and de-
velop a federal common law of agency pursuant to ERISA. The Su-
preme Court held that Congress expressly conferred the authority to
do so on the federal judiciary."' Given the changes in the law since
Boseman and the statutory purposes of ERISA, federal courts should
further develop a federal common law of employer agency.
adoption of the Elfstrom rule.
115 605 F Supp 179,183 (S D Miss 1985) (holding that changes in an insurance policy com-
municated only to an employer do not constitute constructive notice to an employee).
116 Home Life Insurance Co v Chandler, 402 S2d 356, 360 (Miss 1981) (holding that "it is not
necessary for this Court now to make a choice between the opposite position held by the various
states" regarding employer agency in insurance cases).
117 605 F Supp at 182-83, citing with approval the case-by-case approach of the Mississippi
Supreme Court in Home Life Insurance Co, 402 S2d at 356.
118 605 F Supp at 182-83 (adopting a fact-sensitive standard and determining that an em-
ployer could not be considered the agent of the employee for purposes of information communi-
cated only to the employer).
119 Id at 183. Compare Elfstrom, 432 P2d at 738 (finding that the employer/employee rela-
tionship at issue "fail[ed] to reflect true agency" due to the employee's lack of knowledge
regarding, or control over, the "employer's actions in handling the policy or its administration").
120 605 F Supp at 182.
121 For a counterexample, see Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v Ross, 1976 US Dist LEXIS
11840 at * 7 (D DC).
122 See notes 7-10.
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Which rule they should articulate, however, remains open for dis-
cussion. The following discussion addresses first whether there is a
need for a rule of employer agency, and then argues that policy con-
siderations, statutory statements of ERISA's purpose, and congres-
sional intent as expressed in legislative history all support adopting
the Paulson integrated rule for employer agency over the alternatives.
C. Is an Agency Rule Necessary to Fulfill the Purposes of ERISA?
1. Without federal common law, insurers avoid liability that they
would normally bear.
Without a federal common law rule of agency, employers and in-
surers will be able to contract their way out of vicarious liability, leav-
ing beneficiaries with no protection in situations where the employer
misbehaves or makes a mistake."' If the insurer had administered the
plan, or had hired third party administrators who acted on the in-
surer's behalf, mistakes or fraud by these administrators would be at-
tributable to the insurer.2 It is for this reason that agency law is
largely based on the facts of the relationship between the parties
rather than their contract; ' one can imagine the problems that would
result if employees and employers were allowed to contract out of re-
spondeat superior liability to injured third parties. 6 The fact-sensitive
Paulson rule would respond to this difficulty, making the agency de-
termination based on the actions of the parties rather than their con-
tract.
2. Preemption without replacement creates no incentive for
insurers to monitor, inform, or guide plan administrators.
Preempting state agency laws without replacing them also creates
serious problems of incentives for insurers. Without an agency rule, in-
surers will have less incentive to check that an employer is competent
to manage a plan, since they will not bear liability for the employer's
123 See Elfstrom, 432 P2d at 737.
124 Id.
125 See 2A Corpus Juris Secundum Agency § 7 (1972):
Whether as between the parties their relationship is one of agency depends on their rela-
tions as they in fact exist under the ... acts of the parties, and the question is not governed
by the stipulations of the parties. Thus, whether a particular relationship is that of agency
does not depend on what the parties call it, and the parties cannot, where the relationship is
in fact one of agency, change its nature by declaring that it is not an agency.
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
126 See Note, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law ofAgency, 91 Yale
L J 168, 184 (1981) ("[T]he absence of vicarious liability affords the principal and the agent an
opportunity to execute an optimal judgment-proof contract, which leaves the agent insolvent in
the accident state of nature, and which partially evades the tort victim's right to compensation.").
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incompetence. For the same reasons, insurers will have little incentive
to monitor ongoing administration, or to make sure that new informa-
tion (such as negotiated changes in plan coverage) reaches the benefi-
ciaries.
On the other hand, lower administrative costs will likely result in
lower premiums paid by the employees, and therefore the benefit of
employer plan administration will be passed on to the plan partici-
pants. On balance, however, this argument is weak because plan par-
ticipants are unlikely to assess correctly the risk of administrator
fraud.'27 The essence of fraud is misinforming the victim as to the
trustworthiness of the perpetrator, here the employer-administrator.
Given this, plan participants will underestimate the risk and be sys-
tematically undercompensated (via lower premiums) for their as-
sumption of the risk of administrator misconduct."'
Still, perhaps specific knowledge of the trustworthiness of the
particular administrator is not necessary, since an assessment of the
overall risk of employer fraud, if shouldered by the employee, might
produce a reduction in the premiums. But again, the employee will be
at a systematic disadvantage for several reasons. First, while the in-
surer will be a repeat player (and might have access to data indicating
the proper risk of employer misconduct), the employee almost cer-
tainly will not. Second, and more importantly, the employee will al-
most never be the party negotiating the benefits contract with the in-
surer.'29 The employer will not negotiate effectively for the risk of his
own dishonesty or incompetence. The employee will again be under-
compensated for the risk of employer misconduct."' Third, the market
127 See Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment
Law 15-22 (Harvard 1990) (discussing the uses and limits of the market in protecting employ-
ees).
128 See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1127 (1974) (discussing problems of information differentials and proc-
essing in decisionmaking).
129 See Clements v Continental Casualty Insurance Co, 730 F Supp 1120, 1124-25 (N D Ga
1989), for an analysis of the difference between contract negotiation settings and plan admini-
stration settings with respect to the power held by the employee. Because the employee does not
know more than the list of benefits to which he is entitled, "[h]e does not ask whether the insur-
ance plan is 'insurer-administered' or 'employer-administered.' He may reasonably assume that
his employer and the insurer will, in their dealings with each other, do that which is necessary to
provide him with the promised benefits." Id (emphasis added). An agency rule that mimics the
employee's reasonable assumption is therefore desirable. Id. Employees also suffer from collec-
tive action problems in bargaining relative to employers. See Louise Sadowsky Brock, Note,
Overcoming Collective Action Problems: Enforcement of Worker Rights, 30 U Mich J L Ref 781,
782-83 & n 11 (1997) (arguing that collective action problems "prevent[] workers from taking
effective individual action ... because any benefit they gain will be shared by all employees").
130 Dayna Bowen Matthew, Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based
Health Insurance: Of Markets, Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 Wake Forest L Rev 1037,
1039 (1996) ("'Me task of controlling and monitoring the employer-agent's decisions and choices
for their employees is monumental."); id at 1061 ("It is almost impossible for employees, in the
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will not adequately compensate employees for their increased risk of
loss because most employees do not shop around for the best insur-
ance deal-they take the package that is handed to them by their em-
ployer.'31
Finally, even absent the disparities in information and bargaining
power between insurers and employees, it seems clear that the insurer
is the party best situated to absorb the risk of loss."2 Insurers are likely
to identify risky employers and raise rates accordingly. Insurers can
(and will) pass those costs on to all policyholders, spreading the risk
across the client base. On this account, an insurance company can
spread risks and largely be unaffected by a loss that would cripple an
individual employee.
3. The Paulson integrated approach to agency fulfills the
expectations of plan beneficiaries.
Legal commentators have developed a standard for ERISA fed-
eral common law development that protects "the reasonable expecta-
tions of plan participants.""" The plan participants (here, the employ-
ees) have an expectation that they will receive their benefits if they
make their payments, provide notice, and perform their other duties
under the insurance contract." This expectation is betrayed by a re-
gime that denies their claims for benefits because of an employer-
administrator's misconduct or mistake." Preemption without re-
placement therefore undermines the expectations of plan beneficiar-
ies who have fully complied with their insurance contract require-
ments."
Adopting the fact-sensitive approach of the Paulson rule might
better comport with this standard by giving weight to the expectations
of plan participants. When an employer acts as a full-service adminis-
trator, employees will consider their obligations under the contract to
majority of cases, to engage in ex ante monitoring of their employer-agent's purchase of insur-
ance.").
131 See id at 1042 ("As of 1993, 145 million, or 58.5% of Americans were covered by em-
ployer-based health insurance policies.").
132 Insurance companies spread risks by trade. See 43 Am Jur 2d Insurance § 188 (1982)
(defining "insurer" as the party who "assumes the risk and undertakes to indemnify the in-
sured").
133 George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law For Plan Inter-
pretation, 32 San Diego L Rev 955, 1047 (1995).
134 See Norby v Bankers Life Co, 304 Minn 464,231 NW2d 665,668-69 (1975) ("It is [ un-
reasonable and inequitable to frustrate the employee's expectations because of an employer's
negligence in administering the insurance agreement.").
135 The possibility of suit against the employer is insufficient to protect beneficiaries. See
note 38.
136 See Zanglein, 72 Wash U L Q at 671-76 (cited in note 4) (discussing the problems of
"betrayal without remedy").
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be discharged by notification of injury or remittance of premiums to
the plan administrator.' 7 A rule that determines that these obligations
are actually discharged because of an agent-principal relationship be-
tween the employer and the insurer therefore protects participants'
reasonable expectations.
D. Which Rule of Employer Agency Should Courts Adopt?
In developing a federal common law of agency, federal courts
should take advantage of the experience gained while the law was in
state hands. The options available to federal courts are the Boseman
majority rule (employer as agent of the employee), the Elfstrom mi-
nority rule (employer as agent of the insurer), and the Paulson inte-
grated rule (employer agency determined by nature of the tasks per-
formed).' 8 Whichever state rule is adopted pursuant to ERISA must
be specifically adapted to fulfill Congress's intent for the statute,
which in this case is to protect plan beneficiaries.'39
1. The Boseman majority rule.
The Boseman rule states that employers are generally the agents
of the employees when negotiating or administering insurance plans."
Boseman is now the majority state rule.'4' When considering the
Boseman rule as a candidate for adoption as the federal common law
rule, four concerns stand out. First, a strict Boseman approach does
not meet the requirements for adoption of state rules as federal com-
mon law interpreting ERISA because it does not create incentives or
remedies that would reasonably protect plan beneficiaries as required
by the statutory purpose of ERISA. ' Second, at its core, Boseman was
concerned with conflict-of-laws problems, and the rule consequently
does not give enough weight to protecting beneficiaries to pass muster
as an ERISA rule.'43 Third, Boseman itself, on which the majority rule
is based, articulates a fact-sensitive standard that would provide a dif-
137 See Clements v Continental Casualty Insurance Co, 730 F Supp 1120, 1124 (N D Ga
1989) (holding that "[b]ecause the employer is an agent of the insurer for purposes of premium
collection," an insurer may not cancel an employee's policy when the employer negligently dis-
obeys an employee's direction to remit payments to the insurer).
138 See Parts III.A-B.
139 Thomason v Aetna Life Insurance Co, 9 F3d 645,647 (7th Cir 1993) (holding that federal
common law rules adopted pursuant to ERISA must comport with the purposes of that statute).
140 Boseman, 301 US at 204-05.
141 See Home Life Insurance Co v Chandler, 402 S2d 356,359 (Miss 1981) (citing Boseman
as the majority rule). See also note 90 (listing states that have adopted the majority rule).
142 See 29 USC § 1001a(c)(3) (1994) (setting forth protection of plan beneficiaries as a
statutory purpose of ERISA).
143 Boseman, 301 US at 202 (stating that the issue is whether "the policy ... is governed by
Pennsylvania law or Texas law").
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ferent result in modern employer-administrator cases, given the diver-
gence between the employer's interests and the employee's in those
cases." Fourth, Boseman was an early decision; adopting it would by-
pass sixty-three years of the law's evolution in state courts.
As an initial matter, the majority rule does not fulfill the congres-
sional intent for ERISA, and therefore should not be adopted.
Whichever rule is adopted pursuant to the courts' authority to de-
velop common law interpreting ERISA must be specifically adapted
to serve the congressional purposes underlying that statute.4 ' One of
the primary purposes of ERISA is the protection of plan beneficiar-
ies."6 A strict adoption of the Boseman rule would allow insurers to es-
cape payment of benefits based on employer misconduct or error
when any other administrator chosen by the insurer would clearly
have been considered the insurer's agent.'47 The Boseman rule also suf-
fers from the same incentive problems as preemption without re-
placement. If a strict Boseman approach is adopted, insurers will not
have incentives to determine whether the employer-administrator is
competent to administer the plan, or to monitor for misconduct in
administration."
Second, the Boseman court was more interested in the conflict-
of-laws ramifications of its agency determination than it was in the
protection of plan beneficiaries. ' Boseman held that because the em-
ployer was the agent of the employee in negotiating the contract, the
law of the state in which the contract was negotiated was to be ap-
plied."' Subsequent cases treated Boseman primarily as a conflict-of-
laws decision.'"' As the Court's discussion in Boseman demonstrates,
an agency rule appropriate for solving a conflict-of-laws difficulty
might have a very different focus from a rule regulating disputes aris-
ing from the employer's management of the plan.' 2 The unifying effect
of ERISA preemption and development of a universally applied fed-
144 Id at 205 ("The undisputed circumstantial facts require the conclusion that the employer
acted not as agent of the insurer but for and on behalf of petitioner and other insured employees
and in its own interest.").
145 See note 139.
146 See 29 USC § 1001a(c)(3). For more discussion of congressional intent and statutory
purposes of ERISA, see Parts III.E.1-2.
147 See the discussion of Elfstrom, Part III.B.2.
148 For an excellent treatment of the difference between contract negotiation and employer
administration settings, see Clements v Continental Casualty Insurance Co, 730 F Supp 1120,1124
(N D Ga 1989).
149 301 US at 206 (explaining its holding as necessary to avoid the "confusion liable to result
from applications of diverse state laws").
150 Id at 202-05.
151 See, for example, Ryder Truck Rental, Inc v UTF Carriers, Inc, 790 F Supp 637, 641-42
(W D Va 1992) (addressing Baseman in a section entitled "Choice of Law").
152 301 US at 202-05 (focusing analysis on employer's relationships to insurer and employee
with an emphasis on whether Texas or Pennsylvania law governs).
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eral common law would lessen the need for a strict Boseman ap-
proach, insofar as the Boseman Court was concerned that "inequali-
ties and confusion liable to result from applications of diverse state
laws shall be avoided.' ' 3
Third, Boseman itself actually articulates a fact-sensitive standard
that is betrayed by subsequent courts' characterization of Boseman as
an inflexible rule. Although the Boseman rule as cited by later cases is
inflexible, the Boseman case itself actually relies on a fact-specific de-
termination, not a hard and fast rule."' This would seem directly to in-
vite fact-specific adjudication of cases. The Boseman case, therefore,
does not support what later courts refer to as the "Boseman rule. '..
Under this view, the Boseman case has much more in common with
the later Paulson fact-sensitive cases."
Finally, Boseman, as a pre-Erie case, lacks the insight brought by
the evolution of state law after federal courts were no longer able to
determine federal common law. The Boseman rule was established in
1937 pursuant to the Court's authority to develop general federal
common law under Swift v Tyson."7 The Court's subsequent decision
in Erie reversed Swift " As a result, the federal judiciary has not ad-
dressed the question of employer agency as a matter of federal com-
mon law for sixty-three years. In choosing whether to follow Boseman,
courts have recognized that the case was, as Judge Friendly described
it, "one of the last gasps of Swift v T~son.''59
Boseman was not a poorly conceived rule based on its setting
(negotiation of a contract). Boseman is one half of a good rule. In a
contract negotiation setting the interests of the employer and em-
ployee are aligned. ' In these circumstances, a rule designating an em-
153 Id at 206.
154 See note 144.
155 See note 90 for cases following the non-fact-sensitive "Boseman rule."
156 See, for example, Paulson, 636 P2d at 942-43,949; McCann v Washington Public Power
Supply System, 803 P2d 334,339 (Wash App 1991) (following Paulson and concluding that "a ma-
terial question of fact exists whether the [employer] performed most of the administration of the
... life insurance policies, thus establishing an agency relationship").
157 41 US 1, 18 (1842).
158 304 US at 79-80 (1938).
159 Nelson v Aetna Life Insurance Co, 359 F Supp 271, 294 (W D Mo 1973), quoting John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co v Schroder, 349 F2d 406,407 (5th Cir 1965).
160 Boseman, 301 US at 204 ("Employers regard group insurance not only as [beneficial for]
employees but also as advantageous to themselves."). As the law evolved after Boseman, courts
noted that the presumption of agency delegation should vary according to whether the purpose
of the delegation of agency was contract negotiation or plan administration. See, for example,
Clements, 730 F Supp at 1124, citing Dawes Mining Co v Callahan, 246 Ga 531,272 SE2d 267,269
(1980). When an employer negotiates a health contract, his interests are aligned with his employ-
ees': he wants the best coverage for the least amount of money. Id. In a plan administration set-
ting, however, the interests of the insurer and the employer are more closely aligned. For this
reason, "issuance of the group insurance policy [is considered by some courts to be] the 'dividing
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ployer the agent of an employee makes sense. Since Boseman, how-
ever, the Paulson fact-sensitive approach has emerged, which distin-
guishes between Boseman negotiation settings and Elfstrom full-
service employer-administrator settings where the interests of the in-
surer and employer are aligned.''
2. The Elfstrom minority rule.
There are also serious problems with the adoption of a strict
Elfstrom standard as the federal common law rule of employer agency.
The first is a matter of practicality: the majority of states had adopted
a Boseman-like rule before those laws were preempted. 2 Federal
adoption of a pure Elfstrom staidard would disrupt the majority of
agreements already in place. ' Second, the argument that the Elfstrom
court found dispositive, namely that employees lack control over em-
ployers in their negotiations with insurers, assumes that employees
would not choose to delegate to their employers authority to negoti-
ate the terms of insurance policies in order to gain a better group
health plan.'6 This cannot always be the case. If the employee has an
alternative to the group health program, such as the option to choose
reimbursement for private insurance, then opting into a group health
plan is significant; the employee joins the group insurance arrange-
ment in the hopes of receiving superior coverage through group bar-
gaining. 65 To say that such a decision is not a delegation of authority to
negotiate is logically suspect at best. The Elfstrom rule may therefore
occasionally impede natural and desirable delegations of authority by
employees to employers.
E. The Integrated Paulson Rule
1. The statutory purposes of ERISA support the adoption of the
Paulson rule.
ERISA has a clear statutory purpose: to establish standards that
protect "the interests of employees and their beneficiaries."'6 The
line' between situations where an employer is the agent of its employees and those where it is
the agent of the insurer..." Clements, 730 F Supp at 1124.
161 Elfstrom, 432 P2d at 737 (rejecting the argument that the interests of the employer and
the employee coincide in employer-administration cases).
162 See note 90.
163 A similar argument could be raised against the Paulson rule; however, Paulson actually
causes minimal conflict with existing regimes. See Part III.E.3.
164 See Matthew, 31 Wake Forest L Rev at 1043-44 (cited in note 130) (discussing benefits
to employees of obtaining insurance through an employer).
165 Id.
166 See 29 USC § 1001(a) (1994) (One of the major purposes of ERISA is to protect plan
beneficiaries.). See also 120 Cong Rec at S 29933-35 (cited in note 7) (noting that the aim of the
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Paulson rule is the only approach that offers adequate remedies to
employees while still allowing sufficient flexibility in the employer-
employee relationship for situations in which an employee would wish
to delegate authority to negotiate.
The Bosernan rule clearly fails to protect plan beneficiaries.'67
ERISA's purpose is not served by a rule that unilaterally declares that
the employer is always the employee's agent.'8 Since Boseman is a
market mimicking rule,'6 and the market frequently fails to suffi-
ciently protect beneficiaries, "" it follows that ERISA's beneficiary pro-
tection purpose will not be served by preemption without replace-
ment, in which courts defer to the contract between the parties.'
Although Boseman itself does not meet the requirements for
adoption of a state rule pursuant to ERISA, it might present an obsta-
cle to the adoption of the Paulson approach insofar as Boseman can
be said to represent a reasoned judgment on the part of the majority
of states that the lack of an agency remedy against insurers is accept-
able. This argument is flawed, however, for several reasons. First, state
employer-agency rules are now preempted by ERISA; any replace-
ment rule must therefore be specifically adapted to serve the purposes
of ERISA.1'2 While states adopting the Boseman rule were free to dis-
regard protection of employee benefits as opposed to other considera-
tions, 'I courts considering a federal common law rule pursuant to
ERISA do not have this luxury. Furthermore, state regimes had other
safeguards for plan beneficiaries (such as punitive damages and causes
of action for fraudulent denial of benefits) that ERISA does not pro-
pension reform that resulted in ERISA was to increase protection of plan beneficiaries).
167 See Zanglein, 72 Wash U L Q at 674-76 (cited at note 4).
168 See Part III.D.1, discussing how Baseman does not create incentives for employers to
manage plans effectively.
169 See Cass R. Sunstein, Formalism and Statutory Interpretation: Must Formalism be De-
fended Empirically?, 66 U Chi L Rev 636, 645 (1999) (arguing that a market mimicking rule
"replicate[s] what the parties would have done if they had made specific provision on the
point"). In the insurance contract, there is no need to speculate what the parties (insurer and
employer) would do on this point: they include no-agency clauses. See Torello v UNUM Life In-
surance Co of America, 1999 US App LEXIS 32228, *13 (enforcing no-agency clause ill insur-
ance contract). The Baseman rule is market mimicking with respect to insurance contracts. The
problem with this approach is that the employee has no say. Norby v Bankers Life Co, 304 Minn
464,231 NW2d 665,669 (1975).
170 See Parts III.C.1-2 for a more complete discussion of the difficulties with allowing the
market to govern employer-administrated insurance plans.
171 See Torello, 1999 US App LEXIS 32228 at *13 (relying on contract terms between em-
ployer and insurer in the absence of an agency relationship).
172 See note 139.
173 Consider the focus on conflict of laws in Boseman itself, which, since it was not adopted
pursuant to ERISA, was free to concern itself more with avoiding varied state law than with en-
suring employee protection. See Boseman, 301 US at 202 ("[T]he precise issue for decision is




vide.", Because ERISA lacks these other safeguards, even those state
regimes which had adopted a Boseman rule were on balance far more
protective of plan beneficiaries than an ERISA regime adopting the
Boseman rule would be.
This makes a compelling argument for the Paulson standard. The
Boseman rule cannot be adopted in its entirety because it fails to ful-
fill ERISA's statutory purposes,'75 yet elements of the rule should be
preserved. Boseman allows employee delegation of negotiation au-
thority to employers when needed, and protects insurers from com-
plaints that the employer-master policyholder did not speak for the
employees when negotiating a contract or contract change with the in-
surer. The, Paulson rule integrates these valuable elements of the
Boseman rule, yet still protects plan beneficiaries (when the insurer
has delegated duties to the employer) in satisfaction of the statutory
purposes of ERISA.
2. Only the Paulson rule fulfills congressional intent for ERISA
as expressed in legislative history.
The Paulson integrated rule seems to be the type of rule envi-
sioned by Congress. Legislative history contemporaneous with
ERISA's passage indicates that Congress intended "to provide the full
range of legal and equitable remedies available in both state and fed-
eral courts.'..6
Subsequent legislative history also indicates that Congress in-
tended federal courts to
shape legal and equitable remedies to fit the facts and circum-
stances of the cases before them, even though those remedies
may not be specifically mentioned in ERISA itself. In cases in
which, for instance, facts and circumstances show that the process-
ing of legitimate benefit claims has been unreasonably delayed or
totally disregarded by an insurer, an employer, a plan administra-
tor, or a plan, the Committee intends the Federal Courts to de-
velop a Federal common law of remedies.'"
Therefore, where a fact-sensitive analysis indicates that legitimate
claims are being disregarded by insurers, employers, or plan adminis-
trators (or any combination thereof), remedies are to be preserved by
174 See, for example, Dennis K. Schaeffer, Comment, Insuring the Protection of ERISA Plan
Participants: ERISA Preemption and the Federal Government's Duty To Regulate Self-Insured
Health Plans, 47 Buffalo L Rev 1085,1086-89 (1999) (describing a gap created when Virginia law,
which mandates coverage of injuries sustained in automobile accidents, is preempted).
175 See Part III.D.1.
176 HR Rep No 93-533, 93d Cong, 2d Sess 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 4639,4655.
177 Recommendation Report, HR Rep No 101-247 at 56 (cited in note 9) (emphasis added).
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the adoption of federal common law. Congress's goal closely matches
the Paulson rule, which employs a fact-sensitive analysis to determine
whether denial or delay of legitimate benefits by an employer-
administrator should be remedied by the common law remedy of em-
ployer agency."
Of the three approaches, the Paulson rule best fulfills the intent
of Congress by preserving remedies for plan beneficiaries. Congress
intended "[t]he enforcement provisions ... [of ERISA] to provide ...
participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or
preventing violations of the Act.. 7 As previously discussed, Paulson
provides employees with a remedy against an insurer when the em-
ployer-administrator makes an error or commits fraud.'o The Boseman
rule (holding that the employer is almost always the agent of the em-
ployee with respect to an insurer) offers no remedy.'81 Although the
Elfstrom rule does offer beneficiaries protection against employer er-
ror or wrongdoing, a strict Elfstrom approach interferes with normal
delegation to negotiate group insurance contracts and similar situa-
tions."" Again, the Paulson rule is more nuanced: it allows delegation
of negotiation power in contract negotiation settings, but protects em-
ployees who have performed all of their obligations under the insur-
ance contract from the employer-administrator's fraud or mistake.1
From the point of view of congressional intent, therefore, the inte-
grated rule is the best approach.
3. Policy considerations support the adoption of the
Paulson rule.
First, implementing the Paulson integrated and fact-sensitive rule
will prevent a windfall to insurers in states that formerly adhered to
the minority or integrated approach.' Insurers are better able than
employees to calculate the risk of loss due to employer-administrator
error; in Elfstrom or Paulson states, where the insurer is liable for such
178 Paulson, 636 P2d at 939 (stating that even courts claiming to apply a minority or major-
ity rule actually "base their decision upon the facts relating to the division of functions between
the insurer and the employer-policyholder").
179 HR Rep No 93-533 at 17 (cited in note 176).
180 See Part III.B.3.
181 Boseman, 301 US at 204-05.
182 See, for example, Jones v Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co, 605 F Supp 179,183 (S D Miss
1985) (rejecting claim that employee delegated negotiation power to employer in setting terms
of group long term disability policy).
183 Paulson, 636 P2d at 941-42 (finding the employer the insurer's agent when performing
delegated responsibilities); Clements v Continental Casualty Insurance Co, 730 F Supp 1120,
1124-25 (N D Ga 1989) (holding that employer is the agent of the employee in contract negotia-
tion settings and that employer is the agent of the insurer in plan administration settings).
184 See Home Life Insurance Co v Chandler, 402 S2d 356, 359 (Miss 1981) (listing minority
rule states that follow Elfstrom). See also note 93.
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losses, insurers will have passed these costs on to their customers. Pre-
emption of state laws by ERISA without replacement, or adoption of
the Boseman rule, will result in an unbargained-for windfall to insur-
ers in Elfstrom or Paulson states because insurers will have collected
higher premiums to cover a risk of loss they no longer bear.
Insurance companies, however, will certainly pass on increased
costs of providing insurance (created by Paulson or Elfstrom rules) to
customers. Insurers are, after all, in the business of spreading risks.
The opposite is not true: employees are unlikely to bargain effec-
tively for lower premiums compensating for the increased risk of loss
because of employer fraud or error, due to lack of good information
about the risks.18 Even if employees and employers were aware of
changes in insurance law (an implausible assumption), they would not
be able to share the burden with employers and the insurance industry
as easily. Further, there is a risk that employers will hold back the sav-
ings created by the law. As the above indicates, insurers are the party
best able to sustain a change in the law.
An objection to the Elfstrom rule is that a sudden shift to it
would disrupt existing contracts;'6 it is worth considering whether the
Paulson rule creates the same problem. The Paulson rule in fact will
cause the least conflict with existing contracts because it integrates the
two existing strands of state law. Paulson preserves the ability of par-
ties to make sensible delegations to negotiate, and it establishes incen-
tives for insurers (as under Elfstrom) to provide for competent ad-
ministration. 's The fact that Paulson will block the ability of insurers
and employers to contract out. of agency should not matter, since
agency is not determinable by stipulations of the parties. " Insurers
and employers are (as repeat players) necessarily aware of the fact
that agency obligations arise out of their actions, and thus they will not
be taken by surprise if a court finds that the employer and insurer are
in an agency relationship.'89 An integrated approach will be more true
185 The prime difficulty is that employees do not have the same information as employers,
and for this reason, cannot bargain effectively. Norby v Bankers Life Co, 304 Minn 464, 231
NW2d 665,669 (1975).
186 See Part III.D.2 (analyzing the Elfstrom rule as a possible model for federal common
law).
187 Paulson, 636 P2d at 948 (referring to group insurance as a "functionally distinct and effi-
cient system of distribution").
18 See note 125.
189 It is important to note that clear rules may still be promulgated under the integrated ap-
proach, so that employers and insurance agencies are not left guessing as to how their relation-
ship will be characterized. See, for example, Clements v Continental Casualty Insurance Co, 730 F
Supp 1120, 1124 (N D Ga 1989) ("[I]ssuance of the group insurance policy is the 'dividing line'
between situations where an employer is the agent of its employees and those where it is the
agent of the insurer.") (citation omitted).
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to the expectations of parties than would either the Elfstrom or
Boseman rule alone.
Another concern about the Paulson standard is that it will be too
time consuming for courts to engage in case-by-case fact-specific ad-
judication.' 90 A similar concern is that, for the same reason, Paulson
will provide insufficient advance notice to employers and insurers that
their administration arrangements will be deemed an agency relation-
ship.
Paulson, however, sets forth a bright line rule of its own: "In the
performance of a function delegated by the insurer to the employer,
the employer is deemed to be the agent of the insurer. 191 This stan-
dard should provide adequate guidance to parties, while still allowing
the courts the critical flexibility to recognize when employers and in-
surers are engaging in evasive conduct (for example, structuring the
relationship to avoid the imputation of agency).
CONCLUSION
Congress has instructed the federal judiciary to construct federal
common law remedies needed to replace state laws preempted by
ERISA where a fact-sensitive analysis shows that plan benefits are be-
ing unreasonably delayed or disregarded by insurers, employers, and
plan administrators." Federal courts had already begun to develop a
federal common law of employer agency prior to Erie, and now have
renewed authority to continue development of that common law un-
der ERISA. The statutory purposes of ERISA support the adoption
of a fact-sensitive rule similar to the approach in Paulson. Congres-
sional intent, as expressed in legislative history, also supports the
adoption of this integrated approach. "3 Common sense principles of
equity and fairness require a rule that allows beneficiaries, who have
fulfilled their obligations under their insurance contracts, a remedy to
recover the benefits of their bargain. Federal courts should adopt the
fact-sensitive Paulson rule for the determination of employer agency
as a matter of federal common law pursuant to ERISA.
190 Some areas of law are not amenable to case-by-case analysis. See, for example, Wilson v
Garcia, 471 US 261, 272 (1985) (holding that in the statute of limitations context, analysis of the
particular facts of each claim "inevitably breeds uncertainty and time-consuming litigation"). A
substantial majority of courts recently examining employer agency questions have chosen fact-
specific analyses. See Golt v Aetna Life Insurance Co, 2000 Mont 155,2 P3d 841,848-49.
191 Paulson, 636 P2d at 941.
192 HR Rep No 93-533 at 17 (cited in note 176).
193 See Part III.E.1-2.
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